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The manifestos of many of the political parties that 
contested South Africa’s recent general election 
illustrate the fact that corruption is regarded as a 
major problem in the country. For instance, the 
African National Congress (ANC) 2014 election 
manifesto commits the ANC to ‘intensify the 
fight against corruption’, stating that the ANC ‘is 
committed to a corruption-free society, ethical 
behaviour across society and a government that 
is accountable to the people’.1 For many people 
in South Africa declarations such as these, by the 
ANC and its representatives, are highly incongruous. 
Though he is not the only ANC member to have been 
implicated, this is above all because Jacob Zuma, 
ANC president and President of South Africa, has 
repeatedly been linked to allegations of corruption. 
As this article will discuss, the fact that Zuma, 
as President of South Africa, is himself allegedly 
implicated in corruption, is an obstacle to addressing 
corruption in South Africa. Of equal significance, 
in terms of the focus of this article, is that the 
allegations against him have not ultimately served 
as an obstacle to his achieving and retaining the 
status of ANC leader or dramatically affected the 
popularity of the ANC. Indeed, overall support for the 
ANC, and for Zuma as leader of the ANC, declined 
slightly in the May 2014 national election. The ANC 
received 62,15% of the vote, compared to the 
65,9% of the vote it received in 2009, with declines 
being most pronounced in metropolitan areas 
such as Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni. 
Nevertheless, other than in the Western Cape, the 
ANC remained the dominant party in all provinces 
and in all metropolitan areas other than Cape Town. 
Though some argued that this might be understood 
to reflect support for the ANC broadly, rather than for 
Zuma specifically,2 it remains clear that Zuma himself 
continues to enjoy considerable personal support.3
That Zuma and other ANC leaders linked to 
corruption have continued to enjoy widespread 
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support raises questions about attitudes to corruption 
in South Africa. It is of course likely that some of 
those who support the ANC are themselves firmly 
opposed to corruption. They might support the ANC 
on the basis of its role in South Africa’s liberation from 
apartheid, or on the basis of its programmes and 
social policies. Nevertheless, the ANC’s and Zuma’s 
continued popularity points to an obvious conclusion: 
that rather than being ‘united against corruption’,4 
many South Africans are willing to excuse or overlook 
acts of corruption. That attitudes of this kind exist 
is of course reflected in the fact that corruption is 
a substantial social problem. However, corruption, 
unlike violent crime, is not associated with an outsider 
or underclass, but extends into the upper reaches 
of the state and political elite, implying that these 
attitudes are to be found within ‘mainstream’ South 
African society.  
I do not intend to argue that declarations by senior 
politicians of their resolve to address corruption 
may be dismissed as mere rhetoric. As this 
article will illustrate, South Africa has an elaborate 
framework of policies, laws and mechanisms 
intended to ensure the ‘integrity’ of public servants 
and politicians. Furthermore, it would appear that 
there is an investment by some government officials 
in strengthening the detection, deterrence and 
punishment of corruption.5 Tolerance for corruption 
needs to be understood alongside this reality.   
This article is concerned with developing an 
integrated understanding of these issues. It provides 
an overview of the current government integrity 
framework and reform initiatives intended to 
strengthen anti-corruption efforts. Debates about this 
framework and how to strengthen it imply certain 
approaches to addressing corruption. In addition, 
the article highlights work on the history and ‘social 
psychology’6 of corruption. This in turn provides the 
basis for an understanding of the ‘moral economy’ of 
corruption. 
The South African government 
integrity framework 
Corruption as a social problem began to receive 
attention from policy makers relatively soon after 
South Africa’s transition to democracy. During 
1997 and 1998, for instance, government took 
several steps to address corruption, including 
the introduction of a code of conduct for public 
servants and the establishment of an inter-ministerial 
committee on corruption.7 The extensive regulatory 
framework that now exists, intended to ensure that 
public servants and politicians adhere to standards 
of integrity, has taken shape over several years and 
includes, for instance, codes of conduct binding on 
all employees of the public service8 and on municipal 
staff members.9 There is also an executive ethics 
code binding on members of the Cabinet, deputy 
ministers and members of Provincial Executive 
Councils10 (required in terms of the Executive 
Members Ethics Act 82 of 1998), and a code of 
conduct that is binding on parliamentarians.11 
Some provincial legislatures12 as well as a number 
of government departments and other official 
institutions13 have also introduced codes of conduct.  
There are also provisions for financial disclosure, 
and a prohibition against members of the public 
service doing remunerative work outside of the 
public service without express authorisation from the 
executive authority.14 Provisions also exist to ensure 
accountability for the management of finances in 
government departments15 as well as a legislative and 
regulatory framework governing public procurement 
(supply chain management)16 and protecting 
whistleblowers.17 The Prevention and Combating 
of Corrupt Activities Act18 and the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 provide, inter 
alia, for civil forfeiture of illegally obtained assets. 
Laws also provide for the surveillance of high 
value financial transactions by a state-run financial 
intelligence centre.19 Legislation also exists to 
promote government transparency in the conduct of 
its affairs.20 
In 2002 Cabinet approved a public service anti-
corruption strategy,21 and in September 2003 issued 
an instruction that all departments should have a 
minimum anti-corruption capacity (MACC). In 2006 
the Department for Cooperative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs complemented these initiatives with 
the introduction of a local government anti-corruption 
strategy.22 In 2011 the Department of Public Service 
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and Administration (DPSA) introduced a Public Sector 
Integrity Management Framework.23 The DPSA 
and Public Service Commission (PSC) have also 
published various resource materials for managers 
and employees of government departments.24  
Management of integrity 
In line with the obligations imposed by the Public 
Finance Management Act25 as well as the MACC 
requirements, departments and other governmental 
entities have internal systems ostensibly intended 
to ensure compliance with financial reporting 
requirements and promote integrity. For instance, 
a Public Service Commission assessment in North 
West Province in 2010/11 found that six out of the 12 
provincial government departments had dedicated 
anti-corruption units, while in two other departments 
anti-corruption personnel were said to be located 
within Risk Management or other units. Within all 
but one of the departments with dedicated units the 
assessment suggests that staffing is inadequate. In 
the Department of Education, 13 of the 21 staff are 
said to be highly competent. In the remaining five 
departments one staff member is described as ‘highly 
competent’, nine are described as ‘adequate’ and 
nine are described as ‘newly appointed: still gaining 
experience’.26 
Yet even where these structures exist it does not 
necessarily mean that effective action is taken to 
investigate and respond to alleged acts of corruption. 
For instance, of 289 cases reported to the National 
Anti-Corruption Hotline that were referred to North 
West government departments since September 
2004, feedback had been provided on 76 cases 
(26%) and 49 cases (17%) had been closed.27 No 
feedback had been received on any of the cases 
reported during the preceding financial year.28 
Anti-corruption units are only one component of a 
substantial range of structures and procedures that 
departments are supposed to establish. Of these, 
arguably the most important are the core financial 
management functions. As illustrated repeatedly 
by the reports of the Auditor-General, the latter are 
frequently ineffective, particularly at local government 
level.29
Law enforcement and accountability 
mechanisms
Alongside this intricate framework of ethical codes, 
regulations, laws and internal mechanisms for 
the management of integrity, South Africa also 
has an extensive range of organisations with 
mandates that include investigation of allegations 
of corruption. These agencies, referred to by the 
National Development Plan as ‘the multi-agency anti-
corruption system’,30 include: 
•	 The	South	African	Police	Service	(SAPS)		and	
Directorate for Priority Crimes Investigation (DPCI) 
•	 The	Special	Investigations	Unit	(SIU)	
•	 The	Public	Protector	
•	 The	Asset	Forfeiture	Unit	(AFU)	
•	 The	National	Prosecuting	Authority	(NPA)	also	
needs to be understood as part of the anti-
corruption architecture. The NPA houses not 
only the National Prosecuting Service but also 
the AFU, and other units such as the Specialised 
Commercial Crime Unit and Office of Witness 
Protection that may also play a role in corruption 
cases31 
•	 The	courts	can	also	be	seen	as	part	of	this	
enforcement machinery32
•	 The	Independent	Police	Investigative	Directorate	
(IPID) 
•	 The	South	African	Revenue	Service	(SARS)	
•	 Other	agencies	that	might	be	regarded	as	part	of	
an integrity and anti-corruption system include the 
National Intelligence Agency and the office of the 
State Attorney33
In his 2013 State of the Nation address Zuma 
referred to ‘the Anti-Corruption Task Team’, which 
he said comprises the Hawks, the SIU and the 
NPA.34 The AFU may be assumed to be part of the 
task team by virtue of being located within the NPA. 
In addition, several ‘hotlines’ have been established 
by government to facilitate reporting of alleged 
corruption or other problems.
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Governance and oversight 
As distinct from the ‘law enforcement’ role that 
is performed by many of the agencies referred to 
above, there are also a number of government 
agencies that provide oversight, which includes 
monitoring state agencies and promoting their 
compliance with the regulatory and ethics framework. 
These include: 
•	 The	DPSA		
•	 The	PSC	
•	 The	Auditor-General	(AG)	
•	 In	addition	to	ensuring	compliance	with	financial	
laws and regulations the National Treasury 
maintains a database of ‘restricted suppliers’ and 
another database of ‘tender defaulters’
New public service reforms
On 15 August 2012 the National Development Plan 
(NDP) was launched. The plan, a product of the 
National Planning Commission, is intended as a 
strategy to address poverty and inequality in South 
Africa through, inter alia, promoting faster and 
more inclusive growth, higher public and private 
investment, and improved education and skills.35 In 
his State of the Nation address in February 2013 
Zuma said that the NDP had been adopted by 
government and that the activities of all departments 
must be aligned with it.36 
Central to the NDP’s objectives being realised is the 
need for what it calls a ‘capable and developmental 
state’. The potential for developing such a state, 
and the potential to achieve many of the other 
NDP objectives, is clearly directly linked to the 
effectiveness of efforts to address corruption, the 
subject of Chapter 14 of the Plan. Since early 2013 
a number of steps have been taken both in pursuit 
of the ‘capable state’ proposed by the NDP and 
with a view to strengthening the state’s response 
to corruption. The most important of these would 
appear to be the introduction of a new Public 
Administration Management Bill37 that was passed by 
Parliament in March 2014 and awaits the signature 
of Zuma. Described as an ‘anti-corruption bill’,38 it, 
among other things, provides that:
•	 An	Ethics,	Integrity	and	Disciplinary	Technical	
Assistance Unit will be established within 
the DPSA to ‘provide technical assistance 
and support to … all spheres of government 
regarding the management of ethics, integrity 
and disciplinary matters relating to misconduct in 
the public administration’, among others.39 In an 
address in February 2014 the previous Minister 
of Public Service and Administration said that the 
unit was being established ‘to deal with a whole 
variety of disciplinary and ethical conduct cases, 
because we have found that departments and 
spheres of government do not have the expertise 
to deal with most of these cases and we are 
unable to apply corrective measures immediately 
while officials are on paid suspensions for years 
at taxpayers’ expense’.40
•	 An	‘Office	of	Standards	and	Compliance’	will	be	
established inter alia to ‘promote and monitor 
compliance with minimum norms and standards’ 
in public administration.41 In an earlier address 
by Minister Lindiwe Sisulu she indicated that 
this was in part motivated by the fact that ‘a 
vacuum exists with respect to ensuring the 
implementation of recommendations from 
constitutional oversight bodies like the PSC, AG 
and Public Protector’s Office’.42 
•	 All	public	servants	will	be	prohibited	from	doing	
business with the state.43 The extension of 
provisions in this regard was motivated by the 
realisation that those doing business with the 
state were not necessarily only those at the most 
senior levels. 
•	Obligations	regarding	financial	disclosure	will	
be extended to all government employees 
at national, provincial and municipal level.44 
‘According to the Public Service Commission 
and the Auditor General reports, the majority 
of public servants with business interests 
are officials on salary levels 4 to 8 who were 
previously not included in the financial disclosure 
framework.’45  
•	 The	Minister	of	Public	Service	and	Administration	
may specify minimum educational or other 
standards for positions within the public 
service.46 In 2013 the Minister indicated that 
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positions where minimum qualifications would 
be a priority would include national directors-
general, heads of provincial departments and 
municipal managers as well as chief financial 
officers.47
•	 A	National	School	of	Government	will	be	
established to ‘promote the progressive 
realisation of the values and principles governing 
public administration and enhance the … 
development of human resource capacity’.48 
The introduction of the Public Service Management 
Bill was preceded in August 2013 by the introduction 
of a new Public Service Charter. The Charter calls on 
public servants to serve the public in an unbiased and 
impartial manner, not to engage in transactions that 
are in conflict with their official duties, and to act on 
fraud and corruption, nepotism, maladministration or 
other acts that are prejudicial to the public interest.49 
During 2013 a Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) was 
also appointed within the National Treasury. The 
CPO’s functions include the review of ‘high value and 
strategic contracts to ensure that value for money is 
derived and that all contracts adhere to the relevant 
prescripts’.50 Motivation for the establishment of 
the office of the CPO is to be found in the Minister 
of Finance’s 2013 budget speech, which says that 
‘in the present system, procurement transactions 
take place at too many localities … There is very 
little visibility of all these transactions.’51 However, 
one commentator has suggested that these 
measures may just turn ‘decentralised corruption 
and mismanagement’ into ‘much higher level dodgy 
dealing’.52 
Obstacles to the effectiveness   
of integrity framework
Despite this extensive integrity framework, corruption 
continues to be a significant problem for South 
Africa. What then are the obstacles to addressing 
corruption? Are the key shortcomings failures of 
the design or the implementation of the integrity 
framework? The new public service reforms, and 
other recent analyses, reflect a range of different 
views about the answers to these questions.
Some assessments focus on apparent gaps in the 
legislative regulatory and ethical framework. For 
instance: 
•	Whilst	concerns	have	been	expressed	about	
whether law reform can indeed benefit 
whistleblowers,53 the National Planning 
Commission and others have motivated for 
amendments to the Protected Disclosures 
Act to improve the protection provided to 
whistleblowers, and the range of whistleblowers 
protected.54  
•	 The	Public	Service	Management	Bill	identifies	
as a key problem the number of public servants 
doing business with the state. It seeks to forbid 
this as well as to discourage public servants from 
engaging in illicit transactions by broadening 
provisions relating to financial disclosure. Along 
similar lines, another proposal is for South Africa 
to introduce a public register of the beneficiaries 
of trusts and other legal structures.55 The idea 
has recently become the focus of anti-corruption 
efforts in Europe, where trusts and other ‘shell 
companies’ are used to disguise the proceeds of 
corruption.
•	 Recent	events	have	also	highlighted	
shortcomings in the Executive Members Ethics 
Act.56 The Act does not take account of the 
possibility that the Public Protector may make 
a finding against the President. The President is 
supposed to inform Parliament about action to 
be taken against members of the executive who 
are implicated in a report by the Public Protector. 
In effect the President decides on action to be 
taken against him or herself.57  
On the other hand, many of the proposed reforms 
identify the key problem as being compliance with 
the established framework. It is widely agreed that 
factors contributing to the vulnerability of the public 
service to corruption have included the widespread 
appointments of inexperienced managers and 
personnel, and high staff turnover. As a result there 
has been a weakening and sometimes breakdown of 
the management and control systems in public sector 
organisations.58 This kind of analysis seems to have 
informed many of the reforms, including the Ethics, 
Integrity and Disciplinary Technical Assistance Unit 
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and Office of Standards and Compliance provided 
for in the new Public Service Management Bill, as 
well as the appointment in the Treasury of the Chief 
Procurement Officer. Public Service Management Bill 
provisions for the Minister to set minimum standards 
for the recruitment of personnel are also implicitly 
guided by the understanding that improvements 
in skills will help to ensure compliance by public 
servants with the various regulatory frameworks. 
One of the major vehicles through which black 
middle-class formation has been advanced has been 
through a focus on ‘representation’ in the public 
sector.59 The problems of compliance do not merely 
reflect a shortage of skills. As argued by Von Holdt, 
the legacy of apartheid has been that skill became 
tied to white ‘racial power’. Within the public service, 
contesting white domination has been associated 
with the marginalisation of skill in employment 
practices, contributing to an ‘ambivalence about 
skill’ that, with other factors, ‘tended to work against 
the potential for development of a meritocratic and 
effective state bureaucracy’.60 In this context, the 
Public Service Management Bill’s focus on ‘minimum 
standards’ may not necessarily be well received 
throughout the public service.   
Shortcomings in the bureaucracy have also been 
linked to policies associated with the ‘New Public 
Management’ (NPM) that became the orthodoxy 
in the public administration field in the late 1990s. 
Chipkin and others have argued that these policies 
have contributed to the neglect of systems of 
‘basic administration’ and the fragmentation and 
corporatisation of public administration in South 
Africa.61 Though there is a need to strengthen 
systems of ‘basic administration’, the nature of the 
social challenges in South Africa requires that public 
administration continues to maintain a capacity for 
innovation and responsiveness, suggesting that not 
all practices associated with the NPM should be 
rejected.  
The absence of coordination of the overall anti-
corruption effort has also been identified as a 
problem. In the words of a senior public service 
official, ‘[t]here isn’t an institution designated as the 
leader or coordinator of efforts and there is no-one 
clearly responsible for the development of a distinct, 
articulated strategic approach’.62 This echoes a 2002 
critique by the DPSA, which argued that ‘none of the 
existing mandates promotes a holistic approach to 
fighting corruption’.63 Not only is there no effective 
lead agency,64 but none of the agencies has an 
explicit corruption prevention mandate. There is no 
agency responsible for promoting anti-corruption 
education, for instance.
The NDP nevertheless rejects the argument that 
‘fragmentation’ of anti-corruption efforts represents 
a key problem. In line with this, it rejects the 
‘single anti-corruption agency model’ of which 
the Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(ICAC) in Hong Kong is often regarded as the 
premier example. According to the NDP, South 
Africa ‘does not have the institutional foundation to 
make the ICAC a viable option’. In addition, while 
‘[i]ndependence entails insulating institutions from 
political pressure and interference [a] single agency 
approach is less resilient in this respect because 
if the lone anti-corruption body faces political 
capture, the independence of the entire system is 
compromised’.65 Instead of a stronger centralised 
anti-corruption body, the NDP recommends a 
range of other measures to strengthen the multi-
agency system, including ‘a review of the mandates 
and functions of all agencies with a view to some 
rationalisation’ and more funding to enable agencies 
to ‘employ skilled personnel and sophisticated 
investigative techniques’.66 
Political interference 
The NDP therefore defends the multi-agency system. 
However, it strongly emphasises the need to insulate 
agencies that are part of the system ‘from political 
pressures’.67 Of the agencies in the system, the office 
of the Public Protector, under Thuli Madonsela, is 
perhaps the only one that is currently regarded as 
operating relatively autonomously and willing to resist 
such pressure.68 But the Public Protector has limited 
power to enforce remedial action. For example, 
ANC leaders and others used the findings of an 
inter-ministerial task team to nullify findings against 
Zuma in Madonsela’s report on the construction of 
his homestead at Nkandla.69 In addition, not all of the 
previous incumbents of the office have acted with 
the same degree of fearlessness,70 indicating that the 
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nature of the role played by the Public Protector’s 
office is strongly affected by the character of its 
leadership.  
The SIU is the only agency solely dedicated to 
investigating corruption. But it can only initiate 
investigations on the basis of presidential 
proclamations, is orientated towards ‘civil’ rather than 
criminal resolution of cases, and its head is appointed 
by the President.71 Related to the limited powers 
of agencies such as the Public Protector and SIU, 
current analyses of the integrity framework tend to 
identify the question of the independence of the key 
criminal justice agencies – the SAPS, including the 
DPCI in complex or high-level cases, and the NPA – 
as being the primary challenge. 
A central factor giving rise to the need for the 
current political leaders to maintain control over 
criminal justice agencies, is Zuma’s need to avoid 
legal liability for the allegations of corruption against 
him. It is, however, not only the President who 
fears prosecution, but various individuals within the 
political elite. Allowing the criminal justice agencies to 
investigate corruption ‘without fear or favour’ would 
potentially endanger not only the President but also 
some of the political alliances that have helped to 
secure power for the current elite. 
Above all else, political control over the key criminal 
justice agencies is currently exercised through 
control over the key leadership positions within these 
agencies. Since the appointment of the heads of all 
of these agencies is effectively controlled either by the 
President or the Minister of Police,72 senior politicians 
and public servants who are alleged to be involved in 
corruption enjoy a high level of impunity.73 
Where their control over key appointments has 
not been sufficient to protect them against action, 
officials who have attempted to pursue corruption 
cases against allies of the President have been 
the targets of direct victimisation.74 The downfall of 
the Directorate of Special Operations (Scorpions) 
has also been linked to efforts to secure Zuma’s 
ascension to the Presidency.75 
It has therefore been argued in the media that Zuma’s 
supporters are willing to execute ‘a scorched earth 
strategy on public institutions’ to preserve Zuma’s 
power.76 If this is the case, the implication is that 
there are significant constraints on the possibility 
that the autonomy of the criminal justice system will 
be reinforced. This is notwithstanding the fact that 
this is motivated for in the NDP77 which, in addition 
to a general call for the autonomy of agencies in the 
multi-agency system to be reinforced, also motivates 
for the senior leadership of the SAPS to be appointed 
by means of a competitive process presided 
over by a panel.78 In the light of the risks involved 
there is unlikely to be much enthusiasm for these 
recommendations among South Africa’s current 
political leadership.
In order to resolve this impasse some observers have 
proposed that there should be a blanket amnesty for 
acts of corruption.79 This, it is argued, would mean 
that members of the political elite no longer have the 
incentive to undermine the criminal justice system. In 
return for the amnesty it is proposed that one would 
be able to secure the ‘removal of the entire Criminal 
Justice cluster from any possible political interference 
or influence’, thereby allowing the components of the 
criminal justice system to function independently.80 
Implicit in the proposal appears to be the idea that 
the institutionalisation of corruption in post-apartheid 
South Africa was in some ways associated with 
the transitional period and that those who are 
implicated in corruption are not, on a continuing 
basis, invested in the need to use political power 
to enrich themselves.81 On current evidence this 
seems to be an optimistic reading. The more realistic 
approach at this point appears to be the strategy that 
has been adopted by some opposition parties and 
non-governmental organisations. This has involved 
turning to the courts to force government to uphold 
the provisions of the Constitution and other laws 
in ensuring that obviously inappropriate personnel 
are not retained in key positions,82 that charges 
are not inappropriately withdrawn against favoured 
individuals,83 and in contesting legislation that 
facilitates political interference.84 
The history and social psychology  
of public sector corruption   
A somewhat different of analysis of corruption 
in South Africa focuses on the history of, and 
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relationship between, past and present-day 
corruption. Corruption in South Africa predates 
apartheid. Apartheid itself may be depicted as a 
system of institutionalised structural corruption, with 
power being abused to ensure that the country’s 
resources were primarily used to benefit the white 
minority. As argued by Van Vuuren, ‘A near monopoly 
on money, power and influence were in the hands 
of a minority and they used this to either violently 
suppress the majority or, at best, transfer resources 
in order to stave off the inevitable revolution.’85 During 
apartheid, corruption manifested in a multiplicity of 
ways, facilitated by strict official secrecy provisions. 
One place in which continuities between past 
and present corruption can be identified is in the 
provinces, where provincial governments have 
incorporated homeland civil servants into the current 
administrations. Corruption was rife in many of the 
Bantustans.86 Meny-Gilbert and Chikpin argue that 
‘[M]any apartheid-era administrations, for example, 
especially in the former bantustans, had weak 
administrative and technical capacity and were 
deeply implicated in patrimonial relations. As the 
apartheid state progressively ceded power to the 
homelands so the bantu authority system provided 
more opportunities to traditional elites, senior 
bureaucrats and South African companies for the 
accumulation of wealth.’87  
In the post-apartheid era the ‘arms deal’ of the late 
1990s has been said to have played a crucial role in 
institutionalising corruption. Through the deal, senior 
politicians effectively endorsed the use of public 
office for self-enrichment, giving the green light to 
corruption more generally.88 Though there were many 
individuals who benefited, Holden has argued that 
some role players may have supported the deal in 
order to secure funding for the ANC.89 Even if this 
is true, it seems that the boundaries between the 
interests of the political party and those of individuals 
were already blurred before the deal took place90 and 
that the arms deal rapidly became a vehicle for well-
positioned individuals within the political elite to enrich 
themselves. 
Corruption in post-apartheid South Africa cannot, 
however, purely be understood in terms of 
continuities with apartheid and the legacy of the 
arms deal. Another stream of analysis focuses on the 
‘socio-psychological pressures on the new political 
elite’.91 Post-apartheid South Africa is a country in 
which the ideas of racial justice and equality enjoy 
prominence in a global context of the triumph of 
consumer capitalism and the retreat (if not defeat) 
of the idea of social solidarity. A large proportion of 
the white population continue to enjoy a standard of 
living – characterised by the ownership of suburban 
property and consumption of high-end consumer 
goods – comparable to that in the global ‘metropole’. 
But high levels of racialised inequality persist.  
In so far as the members of the new elite and middle 
class define equality in relation to the lifestyles 
enjoyed by white South Africans, many still find 
themselves to be disadvantaged in relation to other 
people of an equivalent professional position. This 
is reinforced by the fact that, as Netshitenze has 
argued, unlike their ‘white counterparts’, members 
of the black middle class often lack historical 
assets.92 Related to this, their changing class 
location also often involves acquiring substantial 
levels of debt. At the same time members of the 
black middle class often have obligations not only 
to extended families, many of whom remain in 
poverty, but other responsibilities that they are seen 
to carry relative to their newly established social 
status and advancement.93 Improvements in social 
status therefore may seem to carry obligations that 
are greater than the privileges that they confer. In 
the words of Njabulo Ndebele, even among the 
political elite the context is therefore often one where 
‘genuine personal material needs …, shaped by 
historic deprivation, brutally compete with social 
commitment that once gave meaning to the struggle 
for liberation’.94 Generalised white affluence alongside 
black poverty, and economic insecurity even among 
much of the black elite, clearly raise profound 
questions about the meaning of equality and the 
terms on which this is to be achieved. 
The vagueness and ambiguity of the term 
‘transformation’ has itself fed into a blurring of the 
distinction between the objective of black middle 
and upper class advancement and that of more 
egalitarian social development. They have been 
presented ‘as if they were one and the same thing’ 
while in practice they are ‘competing imperatives’.95 
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Along with the emphasis on representation in public 
service and other employment, ‘deracialising the 
class of capitalists’,96 thereby ensuring that black 
South Africans are appropriately represented among 
those South Africans who are most affluent, has 
ended up being prioritised over a broader project of 
social change. In practice therefore, the South African 
state’s project of transformation has come to be 
dominated by black middle and upper class interests. 
This in turn has fed into the ‘canonisation’ of policies 
of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE),97 creating 
an environment that is rich with opportunities for 
individuals and groups in close ‘proximity to power’ 
to use this to ‘corruptly secure government work’.98 
The moral economy of corruption 
What is beginning to emerge from these reflections 
on the history and social psychology of corruption 
is a framework for analysing ‘the moral economy’ 
of corruption in South Africa. In terms of one 
strand of this analysis corruption has many of 
the characteristics of a ‘neo-patrimonialism’ in 
which ‘modern democratic procedures as well 
as rational legality’ are built ‘on a foundation of 
traditional and highly personalised reciprocities and 
loyalties’.99 In terms of this type of view, corruption 
is a manifestation of a ‘premodern conception … 
that refuses to distinguish between a public leader 
and public resources’100 and is tied to interpersonal 
connections that are rooted in friendship, familial and 
broader ethnic ties.101 
A second possibility is that ‘corrupt solidarities’ are 
contemporary manifestations of political and other 
solidarities, in part animated by ideas of justice and 
associated with opposition to apartheid and the 
apartheid period more generally. This possibility is 
alluded to by Gilder who asks, inter alia, whether 
‘notions of nepotism and cronyism adequately take 
into account … the solidarity amongst those who 
gave so much of themselves in the struggle for 
democracy’.102 Much apartheid opposition activity 
was criminalised by the apartheid state. Linked 
to this, those within the ranks of the liberation 
movement tended to give precedence to values of 
internal solidarity over those of adherence to the law. 
A contemporary political morality may be a third 
strand in this moral economy. Pointing out that, due 
to practices such as fronting, policy instruments such 
as BEE have not necessarily achieved the objective 
of the creation of a black capitalist class, Chipkin 
suggests that ‘misuse or deviation from public sector 
processes’ might be seen as ‘a condition of realising 
political and economic objectives’.103 In terms of this 
perspective, corruption may then be rationalised 
in relation to the disadvantages that black South 
Africans still suffer relative to white South Africans, 
and be tacitly accepted by many within the elite 
as a means to ‘reverse historic racist inequities’.104 
Indeed, many individuals may not see the pursuit 
of self-interest through corruption and of broader 
developmental goals as mutually exclusive, but simply 
part of the broad pursuit of racial redress. 
In yet another variation, corruption may be 
rationalised in relation to perceived unfair treatment 
in the work environment, also by white South 
Africans who see themselves as having been unfairly 
disadvantaged by affirmative action.105 Thus, in 
rationalising corruption, various loyalties, solidarities 
or moral understandings are potentially brought to 
bear by individuals trying to negotiate their personal 
economic and social realities. 
In a manner that is perhaps comparable to the late 
19th century French society that Emile Durkheim 
observed, current day South Africa remains in 
uncertain and ‘uneasy transition from one state of 
solidarity or integration to another’.106 As part of its 
triumphalism the ANC is often inclined to emphasise 
its role in ‘liberating’ South Africa. Yet it must be 
remembered that democratic South Africa and its 
constitution are products of a negotiated settlement. 
The persistence of corruption serves to highlight the 
reality that many, even within the ANC itself, do not 
necessarily unambiguously endorse the prescripts 
of the Constitution and that it may serve as merely 
one of a number of moral and intellectual points of 
reference.
Engaging with corruption as moral behaviour appears 
dangerous, as it carries the risk of giving credibility 
to and legitimising corruption. However, it may be a 
necessity if there is to be a fuller engagement with 
the problem of corruption in South Africa, and to 
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ensure that efforts to address corruption have greater 
traction. Critical reflection on these issues should 
pay attention to the fact that apparently moral claims 
may reflect deeply held understandings and beliefs, 
but may also be superficial ‘rationalisations’ used to 
excuse  behaviour motivated by greed. As Sykes and 
Matza highlight, criminal behaviour is associated with 
‘techniques of neutralisation ... which enable people 
methodically to counter the guilt and offset the 
censure they might experience when offending’.107
Furthermore, though they may be linked to apparently 
‘pro-social’ historical loyalties or solidarities of one 
kind or another, the alliances that have emerged are 
not benign in their implications. Rather the ‘corruptive 
collusions ... become the new foundation for group 
solidarity … and will be hostile towards any regulatory 
measures, whatever their merits, which emanate from 
outside the group’.108 In due course they run the risk 
of creating ‘a parallel system of power that turns our 
democracy into an empty shell’.109  
Implications for addressing integrity 
The current mobilisation against corruption cannot 
be assumed to represent a general rejection of 
corruption by the elite. Though there are anti-
corruption reformist elements within government,110 
corruption could not exist at the current scale without 
some consensus among significant sections of the 
elite about its necessity and justifiability. Rather, 
government’s mobilisation against corruption is 
likely to reflect a realisation that, while some forms 
of corruption may have been tolerated, it has lost 
control of corruption111 and that corruption has ‘run 
away with itself’. As a result, corruption threatens the 
elite’s ability to credibly put itself forward as acting in 
the national interest, resulting in a loss of legitimacy 
and ultimately the loss of power.  
Ambivalent attitudes to corruption among the elite are 
also reflected more broadly in South African society. 
The absence of a broad anti-corruption consensus 
needs to be taken into account in understanding 
how to deepen anti-corruption initiatives. In many 
countries public pressure has been crucial in creating 
a political environment where investigations against 
high-level officials are possible.112 There has as yet 
not been any instance where it has been possible to 
mobilise broad popular opinion against corruption, 
with corruption providing the main motivation for only 
a relatively small number of community protests.113 
Instead, over recent years, the biggest popular 
mobilisation in relation to matters of corruption was in 
support of the efforts to protect Zuma against having 
to face trial for corruption. In many other instances 
where alleged corruption is exposed, it appears to 
be motivated by the desire to settle political scores 
rather than by an intolerance of corruption.114 
Though there is an elaborate integrity framework 
already in place, and steps are being taken to 
strengthen it, the impression is that anti-corruption 
efforts suffer from a lack of traction. It is possible that 
this reflects deficiencies in the development of ‘ethical 
values’ among perpetrators. But, as this article 
suggests, this may also reflect the presence of an 
alternative ‘moral economy’ that serves to legitimise 
corruption. If this is true it may imply that addressing 
corruption is not necessarily about addressing a lack 
of moral rectitude, but partly involves understanding 
and interrogating the moral claims that are made in 
order to rationalise it.
Conclusion 
This article began by providing an overview of 
the current integrity framework and initiatives 
to strengthen it within the domains of public 
administration and criminal justice. Initiatives and 
debates about strengthening this framework largely 
speak to questions about the effectiveness of the 
framework as a mechanism for surveillance and 
increasing deterrence by addressing the problem of 
impunity. Alongside this, the article briefly reviews 
historical and sociological accounts of corruption in 
South Africa. This provides the basis for a discussion 
of the moral economy of corruption. Instead of 
focusing on questions of surveillance or deterrence 
this analysis implies that efforts to address corruption 
should engage with questions about how to advance 
justice and fairness in South African society. These 
two strands are not mutually exclusive.
Work on procedural justice suggests that people’s 
willingness to obey laws, rules and procedures 
is strongly influenced by the manner in which 
officials associated with institutions of the law 
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conduct themselves. For instance, ‘if courts and 
other tribunals are conducted in a fair and neutral 
manner then obedience to the law in future is 
reinforced’.115 Thus the credibility of current public 
service initiatives to strengthen disciplinary processes 
may be enhanced if they are focused on improving 
both their fairness and efficiency. A public service 
that emphasises not only more efficient, but fairer 
promotion, discipline and human resource practices 
may be more likely to win support, not only for the 
reforms themselves but for the legal framework that 
it seeks to operate within and the social goals that it 
aims to advance. Likewise, the policing of corruption 
more broadly might be more widely supported 
if clearly linked to efforts to advance justice and 
fairness as core principles of South African society.  
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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